Often, design problems are coupled and their concurrent resolution by interacting stakeholders is required. The ensuing interactions are characterized predominantly by degree of interdependence and level of cooperation. Since tradeoffs, made within and among sub-systems, inherently contribute to system level performance, bridging the associated gaps is crucial. With this in mind, effective collaboration, centered on continued communication, concise coordination, and nonbiased achievement of system level objectives, is becoming increasingly important.
) when making coupled decisions.
Since interdependencies between design parameters are generally strong, (1) iterations are numerous, as well as, frequent and (2) bandwidth for required information transfers is extensive.
In order to effectively explore and determine viable solutions to such complex engineering problems, significant advances are required in myriad aspects. In this paper, we focus on decentralized decision-making and the coordination of the associated stakeholder interactions in terms of structuring required communications and tradeoffs. The conciseness of obligatory information exchanges is a crucial aspect in the underlying effort to balance the achievement of sub-system and system-level objectives.
The basic requirements for a comprehensive framework for agile collaboration are summarized in Table 1 . These criteria are subsequently used in Section 2.3 to evaluate the suitability of commonly employed interactions protocols to consistently supporting activities in distributed collaborative design.
Table 1-Characteristics of a Comprehensive Coordination Mechanism

Problem Formulation and Interaction Management
Modularization and Alignment of Design Process and Domain Expertise 2. Support for Co-Formulation of Coupled Design Problems 3. Support for Establishment and Exploration of Collaborative Design Spaces 4. Stakeholder Retention of Sub-System Control throughout the Duration of Design Processes 5. Decoupled Treatment of Problem Formulation and Solution
Concise Information Exchange
Suitability as a Communications Protocol 7. Suitability as a Coordination Mechanism for Structuring Interactions 8. Effectiveness of Iterations
Balanced Achievement of Sub-system and System Level Objectives
Support for Systemic Understanding of the Collaborative Design Space and the Determination of Realistic Targets 10. Suitability as a Solution Algorithm 11. Quality of Resultant Solution
The main contribution, presented in this paper is a framework for establishing and managing collaborative design spaces, complemented by a coordination mechanism that represents a viable alternative to existing instantiations of communications protocols and solution algorithms.
The proposed framework combines elements of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, as well as strategic and extensive form games, with utility theory in a modular fashion. The fundamental goal is to establish consistent support for goaloriented collaboration that ensures (1) the existence of mutually acceptable solutions and (2) congruent interactions, as well as, (3) stakeholder guidance in achieving their respective objectives in light of system level priorities. In order to establish the significance of the proposed framework, we critically review game theoretic means of conflict resolution, collaboration, and trade-off management (as employed within the engineering design literature) in Section 2. We present the proposed alternative coordination mechanism in Section 3 and proceed to illustrate its application via of a simple example, involving a system of non-linear equations. Finally, we compare the results obtained to those resulting from the application of the more traditional protocols, outlined in Section 2, to the example in Section 4. A comprehensive analysis of all results obtained ensues. We conclude the paper with a number of insights and outline avenues of future research in Section 5.
INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESSES 2.1 Interactions in Engineering Design
As a direct result of the growing complexity of engineering problems, elaborated upon in Section 1, design efforts are becoming increasingly segmented. Systems are subdivided into myriad sub-problems, responsibility for the solution of which is assigned based on domain expertise, availability, cost, organizational structure, etc. Conflict resolution becomes a fundamental necessity, not only with respect to multiple, conflicting objectives, but also with regard to differences in priorities pertaining to the stakeholders, operating at each level of the system in question. Fundamental to the successful reconciliation of these contentions is effective interaction. It is the underlying hierarchical relationships that govern the nature of these interactions and determine whether they must be carried out on a one time or a continuous exchange-ofinformation basis.
On the most basic level, interactions among collaborating stakeholders should be considered in terms of the underlying informational dependencies, as embodied within the corresponding information flows.
From this perspective decisions in engineering design processes are either independent, dependent, or interdependent (see Figure 1) . Independent decisions do not require consideration of any other decisions or information generated through their resolution and can thus be made in isolation, regardless of temporal considerations.
Dependent decisions require information obtainable only through the resolution of other decisions and must thus be considered in the sequence prescribed by the underlying information flows.
Finally, interdependent decisions share information content, factor into one another, and must be considered concurrently. It is important to note that interdependent decisions are also often referred to as being coupled. In some instances it is possible to decouple the underlying relationships and impose a sequence, based on the identification and assertion of dominance. Such instances are referred to as being weakly coupled. Strongly coupled relationships, on the other hand, do not exhibit a clear dominance of one informational dependency over another and must thus be solved concurrently.
It is in regard to such strongly coupled relationships that conflict resolution becomes the most crucial. Since the clear dominance of one decision over another cannot be asserted, prioritization of sub-system objectives with respect to one another is subject to contention among individual stakeholders. Usually, these can only assess the impact of decisions within their own areas of expertise and are unable to gauge the affect their choices will produce outside of their domains. More importantly, improvements in system level performance often require sacrifices to be made at the sub-system level. Subsystems, exceeding their expectations, may have to be restrained to improve the performance of those that fall short.
In this manner, more balanced products may be obtained. Since system level tradeoffs require a more comprehensive level of understanding, the stakeholders charged with contributing to a highly segmented and decentralized process are inherently at a disadvantage in accommodating priorities other than their own. Iteration (due to mismatched objectives) is likely and they are forced to communicate in order to gain required information as well as assess their influence on one another. However, communication alone is not sufficient for supporting interactions. The issue of effectively modeling the exchanges required for the resolution of strongly coupled problems throughout a product's design process has been addressed using a number of different mechanisms ranging from software frameworks (see, e.g., [5] [6] [7] ) to the application of multi-disciplinary optimization approaches (see e.g., [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] ), negotiations (see, e.g., [15] [16] [17] ), and more fundamental game theoretic principles (see e.g., [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] ), as focused upon in this paper. Applications of game theory in engineering design can be distinguished according to the underlying information flows they are meant to structure, as well as the degree of cooperation that defines stakeholder interactions. Other distinguishing characteristics emanate from the frequency of interaction, the manner in which responsibility is shared, and adaptability to changes in information content.
An Overview of the Application of Game Theoretic Principles to Conflict Resolution in Engineering Design
The most common game theoretic protocols, used to model strategic relationships among designers sharing a common design space, are Pareto Cooperation, Stackelberg Leader/Follower, and Nash Non-Cooperation. A summary of their application within the literature is provided in Table 2 . Pareto Cooperation is employed to represent centralized decision making, where all required information is available to every collaborating designer. A Pareto optimal solution is achieved when no single designer can improve his or her performance without negatively affecting that of another. Stackelberg Leader/Follower protocols are implemented to model sequential decision-making processes where the Leader makes his/her decision, based on the assumption that the Follower will behave rationally. The Follower then makes his or her decision within the constraints emanating form the Leader's choice. Nash Non-Cooperation is employed to model the solution of strongly coupled decisions, characterized by interdependent information flows, and is characteristic of decentralized design processes where stakeholders are required to tackle design sub-problems in isolation, due to organizational barriers, time schedules, and geographical constraints. NonCooperative protocols are focused on formulation of strategies that "rational" individuals should follow when their actions and objectives are affected by others. In Refs. [19, 23, 24] it is shown that mathematical models for non-cooperative behavior are suitable for formulating decisions in collaborative design.
The resulting protocol is particularly important in multifunctional design scenarios because of the non-required collocation of design experts and extensive coupling within the associated design spaces. In the pursuit of Nash Solutions to coupled design problems, decision-makers formulate Best Reply Correspondences (BRC) . In order to calculate his/her BRC explicitly, a designer assumes the set of values for design variables not within his/her control and chooses values of his/her own design variables in order to maximize his/her objectives. Since the construction of a BRC is a computationally expensive process, evaluation of the function is usually limited to discrete points and a response surface model (or similar approximation technique) is employed to derive an explicit BRC in functional form. The underlying process, however, is prone to approximation errors that can be attributed to poor fidelity and low-order functional fit. The Nash Equilibrium or Nash Solution to a coupled problem, formulated using a Non-Cooperative game, is found by intersecting the BRCs pertaining to the designers involved. This solution has the characteristic that no designer can improve his/her objective function unilaterally. The Nash equilibrium thus ensures that each decision-maker's strategy constitutes the optimal response to those of other decision-makers. The approach, commonly adopted for solving Non-Cooperative decision-making problems is to explicitly calculate the various BRCs and then find their intersection. This method represents the use of game theory as a solution algorithm, evocative of standard optimization practices, rather than a communications protocol. Hence, this solution method does not reflect the actual manner in which decisions are made by designers in a decentralized design process. Another solution technique for solving Non-Cooperative design problems involves making decisions in an iterative fashion. Although this solution approach more closely resembles interactions associated with decentralized decision-making, convergence and stability are not guaranteed. With this in mind, a critical review of game theoretic protocols as applied to conflict resolution in engineering design is provided in Table 2 .
As indicated, there are a number of applications of game theoretic protocols in Engineering Design. A brief overview follows. Vincent [25] first recognizes that different disciplines converging in the design of a product can be modeled as players in a game. Rao implements the cooperative protocol in multi-objective structural optimization [18] and integrated control structure design [26] . Lewis subsequently extends the notion of a game to a design process. Specifically, he synthesizes constructs from Decision-Based Design, Game Theory, and Multidisciplinary Design Optimization in developing a systematic means of supporting systems synthesis via integration and computational coordination of domainindependent subsystem embodiment [27] . Hernández later builds upon the contribution of Lewis by implementing game theoretic principles to establish a mathematically supported cooperative framework that enhances the practical, effective, and efficient integration of enterprise design theory [28] . Further extensions of Lewis's foundational work by Hernández and co-authors include the formalization of interactions among two collaborating stakeholders [23, 24] . Marston introduces the notion of Game-Based Design as "…the set of mathematically complete principles of rational behavior for designers in any design scenario" in Ref. [29] . Specifically, a multi-designer model of engineering design that accounts for uncertainty, cooperation, non-cooperation, and coalitions is developed using the mathematics of decision and game theory. In effect, Marston extends the foundational work of Lewis via inclusion and extension of utility theory for modeling uncertainty, the development of n-player strategic form games, and the proposition of a general framework for coalition form games in engineering design [19, 30, 31] .
A Critical Review of Game Theoretic Protocols as used for Conflict Management
Most of the game theoretic implementations, reviewed in Section 2.2, can be considered to manage conflict by serving as either solution algorithms, communications protocols, or a combination thereof, referred to here as interactions protocols or coordination mechanisms. Algorithmic implementations are centered on reformulations of the sub-problem-specific objective functions in terms of a single, comprehensive objective function, reflecting the respective tradeoff strategies of the corresponding decision-makers.
Instantiations of communications protocols, on the other hand, center on establishing a rational framework for interacting stakeholders to formulate their respective tradeoff strategies in a concise, coherent fashion. Finally, combinations are focused on providing both a consistent basis for sharing required information as well as furnishing a means of conflict management.
Among the game theoretic protocols, commonly employed in engineering design, it is clear that cooperative behavior produces superior results to non-cooperative behavior. Traditionally, however, collaboration in engineering design has been modeled mainly using non-cooperative protocols. This is due to the fact that full cooperation requires (1) full access to the information critical to the resolution of each coupled decision, (2) interoperability of engineering tools and models, (3) cross-disciplinary interpretation of results, (4) information intensive interchanges, and (5) enormous computing power. Another potential shortcoming is that the required trade-off strategy is reduced to relative emphasis in a single objective function. Non-cooperative protocols (of which the Stackelberg formulation is a subset), on the other hand, though computationally tractable have other shortcomings. For example, the approximation of designer actions using BRCs can be a substantial source of error.
One of the fundamental drawbacks in relying on purely non-cooperative formulations is that the decisions of interacting stakeholders must be sufficiently formalized in order to support the required communications. In essence, interactions can thus only be supported once the coupled design sub-problems have been formulated and can be solved to derive the BRCs, required for capturing stakeholder strategies. Once these have been captured mathematically, coupled design problems can be solved either (1) concurrently via BRC intersection and the establishment of a Nash Equilibrium (see, e.g., [19, 20, 32] ), (2) iteratively via explicit BRC exchange and consideration in design sub-problem solution, where improved solutions are possible via robust design techniques (see, e.g., [33] [34] [35] ), or (3) via complete transfer of responsibility for making required system level tradeoffs and BRCs, alongside ranged sets of specifications, to a single stakeholder (see, e.g., [22, 36] ). In the first case achievement of a Nash Solution is dependent on whether the strategies converge, as investigated in Refs. [20, 32] and iteration is likely. Although a certain amount of variability is accommodated in the second case, this is done a priori and in isolation. The underlying aim is that of guarding against wasteful iteration. This is also an aim in the third and final case, where adaptability is limited (due to loss of stakeholder dominion) to those ranges of design variables, specified in anticipation of eventual changes. Overall, these protocols are suited much better to supporting single interactions than dynamic collaboration.
A fundamental limitation of each of the instantiations discussed, however, is that changes in information content are neither considered nor accommodated explicitly. In a majority of cases, stakeholder strategies are captured, communicated, or predicted via BRCs and thus constitute static, uncompromising representations that do not allow for adjustment or modification outside the explicitly considered range (other than via complete reformulation). Furthermore, non-cooperative mechanisms encourage a myopic stance in resolving conflict that emphasizes sub-system performance. Since most protocols are based on single interactions, there is no provision for future refinement. Consequently, design sub-problem goals are likely to be exaggerated in order to assure satisfaction of local requirements. This can contribute to mismatched objectives, the resolution of which requires a certain degree of trial-anderror. Chances of finding a mutually acceptable solution and reducing and/or eliminating iterations can be improved through the inclusion of ranged sets of specifications. This is evident especially in the research of Chen and Lewis [35] , who seek to provide flexibility in multi-disciplinary conflict resolution. Specifically, these authors integrate the robust design concept into Stackelberg Leader/Follower games, developing ranges of solutions, rather than single solution points. Hacker and Lewis [34] and later Kalsi, Hacker, and Lewis [33] integrate aspects of both Type I and Type II Robust Design (i.e., robustness to variation in noise or uncontrollable factors and design parameters, respectively) into the resolution of conflict in order to reduce the effect of interacting decision-makers on one another. Each of these instantiations is aimed at reducing iteration (emanating from changes in stakeholder objectives) by making constituent decisions robust to changes in parameters outside of their control. A similar effect is achieved by Xiao and co-authors, who aspire to ensure a crisp transition from design to manufacture via digital interfaces [22, 36] . The mechanism for eliminating wasteful iteration is the adoption of game theoretic protocols (e.g., Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Stackelberg Leader/Follower) in conjunction with Design Capability Indices [37, 38] . Application of Stackelberg Leader/Follower protocol in conjunction with robust design approaches in order to achieve flexibility due to provision of ranged specifications.
In summary, current decision coordination mechanisms in engineering design are often focused on streamlining the design process by completely excising iteration emanating from trialand-error. This is achieved predominantly via the specification of ranged sets of solutions and the communication of semantically rich information content. While this is an effective modus operandi for changeovers associated with sequential or clearly distinct phases of a product realization process (e.g., Design and Manufacture), it is not in general suited for facilitating dynamic collaboration throughout the design timeline.
Stakeholder interactions must be both effective and efficient in satisfying the constraints defining their respective design sub-problems, while achieving system level objectives in an unbiased manner. A fundamental challenge lies in that considerations of interacting designers continuously evolve, due to changes in understanding, model fidelity, and technology, to name a few. Current decision models and tradeoff mechanisms are quasi static and thus render the reflection of changes in information content virtually impossible without complete reformulation of both designer aspirations and interaction details. By the same token, stakeholders do not actively participate in system level tradeoffs. Since these conflicts are usually resolved either algorithmically (i.e., BRC intersections in Nash games) or via responsibility transfer (i.e., BRC incorporation in design sub-problem formulations for Stackelberg games), decision-makers are no longer aligned with their respective domains of expertise.
Alternatively, once design sub-problems have been properly formulated and stakeholder preferences have been clarified, negotiations can be used to resolve the underlying conflicts in a more dynamic and self-reliant fashion, that maintains stakeholder sub-system autonomy. However, a majority of the associated tactics and hence also the corresponding mathematics are geared towards the maximization of personal payoff.
Consequently, this mechanism is better suited to model loose cooperation or outright competition, and not sufficient to support co-design. Similarly, optimization allows for the succinct algorithmic execution of almost any tradeoff, but fails to support the communicative aspect of stakeholder interactions, severely hampering active stakeholder participation
We note that this review (summarized in Table 2 ), though quite representative, is by no means comprehensive. It is our intention to illustrate the extent of applications that game theory has been afforded in the realm of engineering design. With this in mind, a critical comparison of the underlying protocols using the characteristics presented in Table 1 is provided in Table 3 . As evidenced in Table 3 , different protocols have different strengths. Consequently, not every protocol is suitable to every situation. Although many of the comparative advantages of employing game theory, negotiations, and optimization in addressing the needs of collaboration in engineering design can be deduced from Table 3 , a few stand out.
Many of the commonly instantiated means of managing conflict in decentralized environments are rooted in the assertion that interactions are required solely in order to make suitable tradeoffs among coupled problems. In the search for Nash equilibria, for example, solutions to coupled problems are found via intersection of BRCs. Clearly, this is only possible once all coupled sub-problems have been modeled in their entirety and appropriate strategies for tradeoff resolution can be formulated. Similarly, using Stackelberg games to model the transition from design to manufacture [22, 36] requires transfer of completely formalized decision and analysis models in conjunction with stakeholder strategies.
Since this communiqué constitutes the first decision critical interaction among the parties (charged with making the coupled decision) in the course of their relationship, the existence of a solution is an inherent assumption.
Clearly, solution spaces, pertaining to the coupled design sub-systems must overlap (at least in part) in order for any of the commonly instantiated solution mechanisms (e.g., game theory, negotiations theory, multi-disciplinary optimization, etc.) to yield useful results. Should mismatches in the achievement of sub-system objectives in light of system level considerations be irreconcilable, the only recourse is iteration, as reflected in Table 3 , specifically with regard to characteristics 8a and 8b. Obviously, the inherent cost is proportional to expended resources and the likelihood of discordances increases with (1) design progress and (2) system complexity.
In summary, thus far, such mismatches have been addressed only implicitly through iteration, yielding mutually acceptable results ad infinitum. Unfortunately, the information required to identify such mismatches is traditionally not communicated until all coupled design sub-problems have been formulated, analyzed, and solved explicitly.
Clearly, significant resources have already been expended on behalf of the subsystems at this point. Rather than pursuing the quasi independent optimization of design sub-systems and conscious of the fact that global optimization is likely to be computationally intractable, the proposed approach is centered upon the modularization of interacting parties so that these can maintain their independence, while maintaining a big picture consciousness. Specifically, the focus is on the communication of key information throughout the course of a design interaction, defined here, as spanning the interim from design sub-problem formulation to the determination of any local optima and, finally, any attempts at global optimization. Consideration is also given to the assessment of stakeholder impact on shared design spaces.
Among instantiations of game theoretic protocols in engineering design the balanced achievement of system level objectives in decentralized decision-making is neither considered nor accommodated explicitly during conflict resolution; interactions leading up to the decision point in question are not supported explicitly.
Both of these fundamental limitations are addressed in this paper. The proposed framework for goal-oriented collaboration, explicated in Section 3.3, provides the basis for establishing and effectively managing the collaborative design spaces associated with decentralized design. This is accomplished through (1) the effective identification of those regions within a design space that have the potential of yielding results, acceptable to all interacting parties and (2) the system conscious distribution of shared resources in resolving the associated tradeoffs.
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COLLABORATIVE DESIGN SPACES
The paradigm shift (inherent or implied by the material presented in the preceding sections) that we advocate is to move beyond strategic collaboration towards co-design † . With this in mind, we assert that sharing key pieces of information at earlier stages and, in fact, throughout the course of the ensuing interaction is the preferable modus operandi for co-designing an artifact. In fact, the earlier potential mismatches are identified, the less severe their impact is likely to be. Relying on the majority of currently instantiated protocols such detrimental disparities do not surface until the execution of algorithmic trade-offs. It is for this reason that the majority of the corresponding schemes can be considered to constitute solution algorithms rather than communications protocols. Generally, what is needed is (1) a comprehensive means of facilitating the system-conscious formulation of design subproblems, (2) the communication of required information content as stakeholder consideration evolve, and (3) the accommodation of those solution mechanisms most suited to the problem at hand.
We proceed to present a suitable framework for accomplishing this end. Key components are highlighted in Figure 2 , where the encircled numbers correspond to the Steps of the coordination mechanism, introduced in Section 3.3 and summarized in Figure 5 and Figure 6 . Steps 1 through 8 correspond to the establishment of a collaborative design space that is certain to contain solutions that are acceptable to all interacting parties, while Steps 9 through 13 constitute the system conscious resolution of stakeholder tradeoffs. Specifically Steps 1 through 4 are focused on the formulation and exploration of design sub-problems as well as the characterization of co-dependence in terms of parameter ranges, used to establish the gross extent of a potential, shared design space. Steps 5 through 8 are centered on the subsequent refinement of this space in order to ensure the existence of an adequate solution. Both system and sub-system performance potentials are established in Steps 9 through 10, prior to a strength assessment of interaction effects in Steps 10 through 11 and the designation of stakeholder precedence in fixing values of design variables to determine the solution to the coupled system in Step 13. We note that Steps 9 through 13 can be replaced with any of the more traditional protocols discussed in Section 2.2, including optimization, thereby making the framework adaptable to supporting any conceivable relationships, encountered in design. 
Overview
As indicated in Section 1, there are many motivations for facilitating effective information exchanges in engineering design processes. Our focus in this paper, however, is on balancing the achievement of sub-system goals in light of system level requirements. The aim is to seek out more evenly matched solutions, the bias (i.e., weighting) of which can be controlled explicitly. In contrast to most instantiations of game theoretic protocols in engineering design, which focus on solving coupled design problems either algorithmically or by minimizing/eliminating required interactions, as indicated in Section 2, we seek to make these interactions effective. Preliminary efforts in this direction require individual stakeholders to relinquish or transfer control over their respective domains of expertise in order to achieve a solution to coupled design problems. This can be facilitated via (1) the communication of ranged sets of design solutions (to be refined by downstream decision-makers) [22, 36] or (2) by desensitizing design sub-problems to coupled parameters [35] . Other examples include the creation of a clean digital interface between design and manufacture in Refs. [22, 36, 39, 40] . While these mechanisms may be appropriate in circumstances when an actual handoff from one phase of a product realization process to another occurs, they are not suited for collaborative design efforts requiring repeated interactions along a design timeline. In collaborative, decentralized design scenarios that cannot be decoupled (or sequenced) and require the concurrent consideration of multiple interrelated sub-systems, we consider it paramount that individual stakeholders retain dominion over the design sub-problems which they have been assigned throughout the duration of a given design process. This is especially important, bearing in mind that models are generally valid only within the narrow bounds, considered during their formulation. Changes exceeding these bounds require careful consideration and potential reformulation of the associated simulations.
A clear understanding of domain specific assumptions, tradeoffs, and implications is thus crucial. Rather than reducing complexity of the resulting design process via centralization, we advocate support of decentralized decisionmaking via standardization and modularization of the underlying models, supported by effective coordination. In this manner, stakeholders are able to retain dominion over their respective sub-problems and work synergistically towards mutually agreeable solutions.
A majority of available models constitutes static representations; they are incapable of effectively incorporating evolving information content, while preserving the underlying manner in which decisions are structured. Considering that responsibility for design sub-problems is often transferred during the course of a design process (in order to facilitate conflict resolution) this is a fundamental shortcoming. The static nature of the underlying models limits this transfer to the communication of a design space "snapshot", particular to the current state of information. In consideration of this, loss of stakeholder dominion is highly undesirable, since an in-depth understanding of the domain models and any underlying assumptions and limitations is required to make cogent inferences beyond the communicated nugget of expertise. A change, deviating beyond the bounds within which the model is valid, requires decision model reformulation by the originating domain expert, resulting in often costly iteration. A fundamental requirement for interfacing interacting decisionmakers along a design timeline, thus, is a domain independent means of modeling design problems that can be amended indefinitely. For this purpose, modular, domain independent decision templates, based on the mathematical constructs of the Decision Support Problem Technique [41] [42] [43] [44] , have been developed.
Since we focus on the interactions among distributed stakeholders, rather than on the models used to represent their perspectives, in this paper we do not go into an in-depth explanation here, but refer the reader to Ref. [45] . Suffice it to say, that the resulting decision templates provide a modular, computer interpretable means for design problem formulation that serves as the basis for enabling consistent and dynamic interactions.
A System of Non-Linear Equations
Having provided an overview of game theoretic instantiations of solution algorithms and communications protocols within the literature, we present an alternative coordination mechanism in Section 3.3. In order to evaluate this novel approach to conflict management in comparison to more traditional ones, we rely on a simple example. Specifically, we focus on solving the system of non-linear equations, given by and illustrated in Figure 3, 
A Protocol for the Co-Designed Solution of a Coupled System
As indicated in Section 3.1, our focus in this paper is on structuring the interactions of stakeholders charged with solving coupled design problems, rather than on the proper formulation of sub-problems. Consequently, this discussion is focused predominantly on the interactive exploration of the system of non-linear equations introduced in Section 3.2 by two designers. The steps in the proposed interactions protocol are outlined in Figure 5 . Associated with these steps, is the evolution of the shared design space for the non-linear equations and the nature of the communicated information as illustrated in Figure 6 . The interactions protocol is discussed in detail as follows. Considering the progression indicated in Figure 5 These preliminary ranges are communicated among the two stakeholders, who each in turn proceed to investigate feasible ranges for design variables by assuming full control over all pertinent parameters (Step 2). The computational effort involved in doing so can be alleviated through the use of space filling experiments such as Latin Hypercubes [46] . Since the design variables of Designer A constitute the constraints of Designer B and vice versa, the extent of the collaborative design space that is feasible is determined to be Steps 3, 4) . Realistic targets are also determined based upon potential performance within the feasible region of the shared design space. These targets are then used to assess and capture in functional form of the preferences of individual designers. This is accomplished through the determination of utility functions (Step 5). Single attribute utility functions are assessed based on stakeholder preferences and attitude towards risk. For details on the process involved in arriving at single attribute utility functions and satisfaction of the underlying axioms, the reader is referred to a standard reference on Utility Theory [47] [48] [49] or [50] . In order to bound designer preferences beyond mere minimization or maximization of objectives and arrive at richer representations of the underlying objectives, preference ranges are assessed explicitly. These extend from unacceptable (i.e., 
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B U e − = − , respectively. An additional advantage is that these preferences are also employed as a problem independent means of normalizing design sub-system performance for consideration in system level tradeoffs. Such an absolute measure stands in marked contrast to the relative evaluation resulting form the use of achievable ranges of objective values for normalization, as described in Section 4.4. Figure 7 and those resulting in 0.85 i U ≥ , plotted in Figure 8 ). As previously mentioned, the computational burden of doing so can be reduced through reliance on experimental design techniques. In the absence of overlapping areas of interest, stakeholders can progressively relax the constraints inherent in their preferences (i.e., lower their target utilities) until overlap exists. Based on the associated satisfaction level, designers can then either reassess their expectations or proceed, adjusting the system level bias (i.e., changing the manner in which the tradeoffs among the utilities of Designers A and B are weighted) as dictated by overarching design requirements ( Step 9) . In this case, we have assumed equally weighted system level objectives, thus not introducing a controllable bias.
As indicated in Figure 7 and Figure 8 , there are a significant number of points within the shared design space that will result in solutions that range from being desirable to quasi ideal for both decision-makers. The resulting overlap is illustrated for combined utilities 0.75 In fact, this utility is the highest system utility possible for the given set of preferences and system level weighting, as determined through exhaustive search. This solution is plotted alongside those obtained using other communications protocols for visual comparison in Figure   13 .
Alternatively, assigning precedence to Designer B in making the final determination, produces the following solution: ( , ) (4.80,2.20) A = are matched more evenly. Nevertheless, it is important to note that both solutions represent mutually desirable performance achievements, since they emanate from the feasible region of a methodically constructed collaborative design space.
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED INTERACTION
MECHANISM WITH GAME THEORETIC PROTOCOLS After detailing the proposed alternative coordination mechanisms and illustrating its application using a simple example, we proceed to contrast the results obtained to those resulting from the application of more traditional means of conflict management in decentralized design.
Non-Cooperative Solution
The non-cooperative solution is modeled using a Nash protocol, in which each of the interacting Designers determines his/her best response to an assumed set of actions by the other party. The design sub-problems associated with individual designers are formulated as separate compromise Decision Support Problems (cDSPs) [51, 52] . The solution of these cDSPs results in a set of BRCs, which encapsulate the designers' rational reactions. The Nash Solution is determined by intersecting or overlapping these BRCs. A particular solution can be chosen from within the resulting solution space. The mathematical formulation and solution of a noncooperative game, using the cDSP, is shown in Figure 11 . Although non-cooperative behavior is not usually desirable in collaborative design, the associated models can be useful in resolving conflict without tedious iteration (provided that a feasible solution exists), as indicated in Section 2.1. The Best Reply Correspondences, constituting the strategies for Designers A and B in achieving their assigned objectives during the solution of the system of non-linear equations introduced in Section 3.2 are 
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Non-Cooperative Stackelberg Leader/Follower Solution
The Stackelberg Leader/Follower protocol is a subset of Non-Cooperative Game Theory and is best suited when one stakeholder dominates the decision-making process (i.e., the informational dependence is strongly one-sided). Nevertheless it is also commonly employed when sequential resolution of a design process is more practical from an organizational perspective. The primary goal is that of eliminating iteration, traditionally associated with sequential interactions. In the Stackelberg formulation a Leader is chosen and assigned priority. The Follower's actions are predicted and considered accordingly in the solution of the Leader's design problem. This is usually accomplished via the formulation of a BRC. Once the Leader has fixed the values of his/her design variables, control is given to the Follower, who proceeds to determine the most suitable values of his/her design variables given the Leader's choice. Clearly the order in which stakeholder objectives are considered has a significant impact on the nature of the solution and the Leader is thus almost always at a tremendous advantage.
With respect to the example, there are two possible scenarios, corresponding to either of the two interacting designers taking the lead. Figure 13 . It is important to note that uncertainty usually associated with Stackelberg games, regarding the prediction of Follower actions, has been removed from this example by using the actual BRCs to model this response within the Leader's problem formulation. The solution obtained is thus an example of the best achievable answer associated with this scenario. Obviously, improvements are possible by considering robustness or ranged solution sets, as pointed out in Section 2.
Non-Cooperative Solution with Control Transfer
Another possibility for the non-cooperative resolution of the inherent conflict between the two stakeholders is the absolute transfer of control to a single decision-maker. This stands in marked contrast to other non-cooperative protocols which preserve shared control over design variables and only differ in terms of the sequence in which the required decisions are made. Designers, given complete control over a domain are likely to pursue their own objectives, in lieu of making more balanced tradeoffs. Besides a desire to maximize personal payoff, this is due in part to their inherent inability to (1) incorporate/evaluate preferences at the systems level and (2) interpret preferences of collaborators in light of lacking response information. Consequently, there are two possible scenarios. The first centers on Designer A assuming complete responsibility for making the coupled design decision. In the second scenario Designer B is placed in charge of solving the system. The solution in the former is ( , ) (6.00,0.00)
A B X X = (marked with a circle in Figure 13 ) and has associated with it the objective function values 110.00
A F = and 200.00
The outcome in the latter is ( , ) (0.00,5.00)
A B X X = , indicated by the square in Figure 13 . Objective function values for Designers A and B are 200.00
A F = and 325.00 B F = , respectively. Clearly these results are located at opposite ends of the spectrum. This is to be expected since stakeholders here are interested primarily in pursuing their own objectives.
Cooperative Solution
Cooperative resolution of coupled decisions usually constitutes reformulation of constituent design sub-problems as a single decision with multiple objectives (analogous to those held by the individual decision-makers). In this case, individual compromise DSP formulations, associated with each designer, are merged in order to formulate a single compromise DSP for the combined decision problem, the solution of which represents the overarching system level decision (see Figure  12) . Tradeoffs among the competing objectives are usually weighted in a manner that reflects system level prioritization. Here, we have chosen an evenly matched Archimedean weighting scheme, and assign equal weights to all objectives in the weighted sum. Achievement of objectives is normalized by the range of objective function values that may be achieved over the feasible range of design variables. The cooperative solution is determined to be ( , ) (0.00,5.00) Figure 13 . It is important to note that this result, though the consequence of equal weighting, is biased towards achieving the objectives of Designer B. In fact, these have been overachieved substantially. This is a direct consequence of the nature of the collaborative design space and the manner in which objectives are evaluated. Specifically, it is the aspect of normalization, required for a weighted sum, which introduces the biggest challenge. While normalization with respect to the best and worst attainable solutions makes sense from the perspective of strict maximization and minimization, the risk of overachievement of certain objectives and significant underachievement with respect to others is significant, as illustrated here.
Comparison of Results Obtained
It is clear from both Figure 13 and Table 5 that solutions to the system of non-linear equations introduced in Section 3.2 vary widely, within the feasible ranges of the design variables, identified in Section 4.1. A majority of the solutions are biased towards the achievement of Designer B's objectives. Consequently these are clustered closely together in the vicinity of Designer B's global optimum. The only solution, not included in this group, is that corresponding to a complete transfer of control to Designer A. As pointed out in Section 4.4 for the case of cooperative interaction models, this consistent bias is due largely to the underlying relationship among competing objectives within the shared design space, as well as the manner in which these are normalized. Algorithmic conflict resolution, based on the use of stakeholder BRCs (that are derived via design sub-problem objective optimization and represent static, non-cooperative design strategies), also does not remediate this inherent bias. In fact, results obtained tend to be inferior to cooperative solutions. With this in mind, an alternative coordination mechanism, aimed at facilitating more balanced conflict resolution via goal-oriented collaboration, was introduced in Section 3.3. Subsequently, it was applied to solving the same example problem for illustration and comparison.
As evidenced by the results, reported in Table 5 , the codesigned solution, obtained via the proposed mechanism, is superior even to the cooperative solution. Although this may seem suspect at first, there is a perfectly reasonable explanation. To be specific, it is the manner in which the goals are formulated and design freedom is reduced in the traditional approach that renders it ineffective in this scenario. Had (1) a feasible collaborative design space been established and (2) system and sub-system objectives been treated separately, prior to any attempt at managing the conflict inherent therein, the cooperative solution would match the co-designed solution. With this in mind, the extent to which the objectives of Designer A fall short of his/her requirements is indicated by the over-/under-achievement of objectives indicated in parentheses below the corresponding utilities (U A and U B ) resulting from each of the protocols in Table 5 . These numbers underscore the extent of the mismatch and the inherent bias in this problem towards achieving (and over-achieving) the objectives of Designer B. It is only through the goal-oriented interactions, associated with co-designing this system, that this conflict is successfully addressed. The central mechanism is design problem exploration at the system as well as the sub-system level. 
Critical Analysis of the Proposed Coordination Mechanism
Comparing the results obtained in Section 3.3, using the proposed communications protocol for dynamic coordination, with those obtained in Sections 4.1 through 4.4 via more traditional game theoretic conflict resolution schemes, it is clear that interactions based upon BRC usage are likely to exclude a fair number of desirable solutions. This is supported by the clustering of solutions in Figure 13 and the illustration of regions of the shared design space meeting or exceeding the targets posed in the example, as focused upon in traditional optimization, in Figure 14 .
Striving strictly to minimize or maximize the objective responses, pertaining to interacting individuals, unnecessarily eliminates acceptable regions of the shared, system level design space. Often this results in the absence of mutually desirable solutions (see Figure 14) , causing an often lengthy process of trial-and-error iteration. Moreover, solutions tend to be dominated by those objectives having lower sensitivities and more attainable goals. This is evident from Figures 7, 8 , and 14, where larger regions of the collaborative design space are occupied by the "x" marks of Designer B than the "o" marks representing acceptable solutions for Designer A.. Traditional solution schemes, based on static and non-cooperative strategies are thus likely to yield solutions that reflect problem formulation, rather than benefiting system response. The proposed communications protocol provides for the effective and collaborative exploration of shared design spaces and ensures more balanced results by reducing inherent biases and facilitating dynamic interactions.
Although the proposed coordination mechanism is intended to serve as an alternative to currently instantiated means of conflict resolution, the associated framework for ensuring the existence of feasible solutions can also be used in conjunction with more traditional game-, negotiations-, and optimization-based solution algorithms as indicated in Figure 2 . The inherent benefit in the modular architecture of the proposed approach is the support provided in establishing the groundwork for resolving coupled problems by virtually any means, appropriate to the particular problem at hand. Consequently, the framework is adaptable to many other hierarchical relationships commonly associated with design processes and their corresponding interactions. Specific examples (not suited to co-design) include the transfer of responsibility for determining design parameters from upstream (e.g., design) to downstream (e.g., manufacturing) decisionmakers and the non-cooperative behavior of entities in certain types of value chains. While the former have been handled predominantly through trial-and-error iteration and Stackelberg games, the latter has been addressed extensively through negotiations and Nash games. 
CLOSING REMARKS
Often, design problems are split along disciplinary and organizational lines. Consequently, responsibility for their resolution is shared. A majority of efforts, focused on supporting collaborative decision-making, center on one-time interactions and their improvement via the communication of richer information content. The underlying aim is the improvement of solution quality as well as reduction and/or elimination of required iterations.
In this paper we present an alternative interactions protocol for conflict resolution, centered on continued communication, concise coordination, and non-biased achievement of overarching system as well as sub-system objectives. The proposed coordination mechanism is based on structuring the interactions of decision-makers, acting as stakeholders in the solution of strongly coupled design problems, and ensuring more balanced solutions, as illustrated through application to a simple example. Specifically, stakeholders are guided through the (1) establishment and assessment of collaborative design spaces, (2) identification and exploration of regions of acceptable performance, (3) progressive reduction of ranges in design variables considered, and (4) assessment of design sub-problem sensitivity. Most importantly, stakeholder dominion over design sub-system resolution is preserved throughout the duration of a given design process. Goal-oriented collaboration that (1) more accurately represents the mechanics underlying product development and (2) facilitates interacting stakeholders in achieving their respective objectives in light of system level priorities via improved utilization of shared design spaces and avoidance of unnecessary reductions in design freedom is thus supported. Continued interactions are rendered both more effective as well as efficient, thereby constituting a viable alternative to well established game theoretic means of structuring interactions and a solid foundation for moving beyond strategic collaboration towards co-design.
